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Introduction
Japan's constitutional tradition has long borrowed from other countries. Over the past 1,300 years, Japan has turned to China, France, Ger2
many, and the United States for guidance in developing its written law.
Despite this large-scale reception of foreign law, however, Japanese constitutionalism has not been particularly receptive toward foreigners. This disinclination can be detected in the current Constitution of Japan, as well as
the five decades of case law it has generated.
The promulgation of the Japanese Constitution has sparked controversy since its promulgation. Unlike the previous Meiji Constitution, the
postwar Constitution was initially drafted by a group of Americans, many
of them with little legal experience, under the command of General Doug1.

MARIANNE MOORE, THE COMPLETE POEMS OF MARIANNE MOORE, at vii

(1967).

f The author wiskes to thank many people for their advice and support. Professor
Mitchel Lasser gave insightful and sensitizing suggestions at key stages of the writing
process. Audiences at the East Asian Philosophy of Law Conference at National Taiwan
University, and the East Asian Studies Graduate Student Conference at Columbia
provided useful feedback from various disciplines and viewpoints. Soo Chung, Eliot
Walker, and the other editors at Cornell International Law Journal showed acumen,
patience, and great attention to detail throughout the editing process. I offer this piece
to the memory and spirit of my mother, Elaine Gerber Webster.
2. Its first legal code, the seventh-century Constitution of Prince Sh6toku, reflected
the central governing principles of China, Japan's better organized neighbor. David A.
Funk, TraditionalJapaneseJurisprudence:Justifying Loyalty and Law, 17 S.U. L. REV. 171,
178 (1990). In the late nineteenth-century, to bolster its status vis-A-vis the west, Japan
promulgated the Meiji Constitution (1889) and Civil Code (1891), both of which drew
heavily on French and German sources. See generally Yasuhide Kawashima, The American Constitution and Japanese Minp6, 1945-1980, 21 INT'L LAW. 1167 (1987). Most
recently, after World War II, Japan made its last major legal borrowing from abroad in
drafting an American-style constitution. Id.
39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 435 (2006)
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las MacArthur. 3 Additionally, critics hold, the document was imposed on
Japan like a package of unpalatable dictates foisted by the victorious
United States. 4 Early critics also feared the document would continue to
subject Japan to American influence. 5 Undoubtedly, America used its
superior positioning to insert key protections into the Constitution, such as
MacArthur's three principles. 6 But to think the Constitution was simply an
American imposition overlooks a critical part of the process: its adoption
and adaptation by the Japanese. Through a process of "selective reception," the Japanese also restricted the reach of many constitutional
7
provisions.
This note attempts to reinsert Japanese agency into the creation of the
Japanese Constitution. By focusing on the Japanese adaptation of the
English-language document--and its concomitant deletions, interpretations, and accommodations--we find that the Japanese Constitution is no
3. Of course, the Meiji Constitution was no purebred, composed in secrecy at the
hand of four Japanese and a German. See GEORGE M. BECKMANN, THE MAKING OF THE
MEIJI CONSTITUTION: THE OLIGARCHS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL

DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN,

1861-1891, at 77-83 (1957).
4. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Port, Article 9 of the JapaneseConstitution and the Rule of Law,
13 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 127, 153 (2005) ("The Constitution does not come
'from' the Japanese people. Rather, it is an imposed constitution.").
5. Typical of this position are the following comments made by Ugata Junz6, formerly a law professor at Kyushu University. Though talking only about human rights
provisions, Ugata's language captures well the sentiment that the Constitution is an
unwelcome scolding impressed upon the Japanese:
Whether you call it a given constitution, or an imposed constitution, the autonomous and active will of the Japanese people [kokumin] is nowhere to be seen.
There is all the difference in the world when compared with Article 1 of the
German Basic Law: "Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect
it shall be the duty of all state authority." This statement is clearly suffused with
respect for human rights, one that springs from the feelings of the people. It
teems with respect for basic human rights. But the words concerning our basic
human rights are nothing more than oratory, mere prose. To put it frankly, the
blessing of those lofty human rights given to the Japanese people [kokumin]
were, so to speak, an admonition from the victor to the vanquished. It is not a
constitutional provision, but a war lesson from the victor to the vanquished.
UGATA JUNZO, NIHONKOKU KENPO NO KAISHAKU TO HIHAN [INTERPRETATION AND CRITICISM
OF THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION] 137 (1972) (translated by author).

6. MacArthur's three principles, or "Constitutional musts," included the maintenance of a dynastic emperor, renunciation of war as a "sovereign right of the nation,"
and the abolition of Japanese feudalism. See KYOKO INOUE, MAcARTHUR'S JAPANESE CONSTITUTION: A LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL STUDY OF ITS MAKING 16 (1991); Douglas MacAr-

thur, Three Basic Points (Feb. 3, 1946) (MacArthur's notes), available at http://
www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/072/072tx.html. The National Diet Library
website now devotes a special section to the "Birth of the Constitution ofJapan." Historical documents, including the discussions of the National Diet, Japanese officials' diaries,
and a helpful timeline, are available in Japanese and, to a more limited extent, English.
See Nat'l Diet Library, Birth of the Constitution ofJapan, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2006).
7. See generally Claire J. Hur, Returnees from South America: Japan's Model for Legal
Multiculturalism?, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL'YJ. 643, 670-71 (2002) (noting three areas of
human rights protections thatJapanese officials narrowed during the collaborative drafting process: the rights of individuals (vis-a-vis the "public welfare"), the rights of foreigners, and the rights of women and illegitimate children). This Note focuses on the second
of these, in part because of the intriguing drafting history.
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carbon copy of its Anglophone counterpart. Rather, the Japanese officials
who helped draft the Japanese-language Constitution in essence recomposed it. In so doing, they limited provisions and guarantees that the American side proposed, while ensuring their own positions were embedded in
the document or deferred for later explanation.
Specifically, the Japanese stripped away constitutional provisions protecting the rights of foreigners. This process actually involved two distinct
yet related tacks: a) omitting provisions explicitly protecting aliens; and b)
translating the relatively inclusive English term "the people" with the more
circumscribed Japanese word kokumin, meaning "people," but more specifically "citizen" or "national." 8 Rights the Americans intended to extend to
"all natural persons" ended up going only as far as Japanese "citizens."
The result was the excision of foreigners both from the constitutional text,
as well as its protective penumbra. At the same time, however, this textual
exile did not resolve problems concerning the rights of foreigners in Japan.
In the absence of a constitutional mooring, foreigners have instead
turned to Japanese courts to determine their status. Three cases in particular shed light on how the Japanese judiciary has responded to this constitutional lacuna. 9 In 1978, the Supreme Court of Japan held that a resident
alien shall enjoy the same rights as a Japanese national, save those which
"by their nature" must be limited to the Japanese. 10 In a less influential,
but highly publicized 1999 decision from the Shizuoka District Court, a
judge invoked an international human rights treaty (the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD))
to fashion a remedy for a foreigner in a racial discrimination suit.1 1 Most
recently, the Supreme Court invoked the constitutional principle of
"national sovereignty" in permitting the Tokyo city government to exclude
12
foreigners from civil servant appointments.
In other words, the removal of foreigners from the Constitution has in
the end merely deflected the decision-making process to a different branch
of government, namely, the courts. While the Supreme Court has taken a
cautious and conservative approach to interfering with the other
branches,1 3 lower courts have been able to broaden the source of protection, such as international treaty law.
8.

KENKYUSHA'S NEW JAPANESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY

904 (4th ed., 1974).

9. See infra Part IV.
10. Ironically, the Supreme Court turned to Chapter Three of the Constitution,
where many of the omissions took place, in deciding the "nature" of foreigners' rights in
Japan. See McLean v. Minister of Justice, 32 MINSHU 1223 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 4, 1978).
11. See Bortz v. Suzuki, 1045 HANREI TAIMUZU 216 (Shizuoka Dist. Ct., Oct. 12,

1999).
12. See Chong v. Tokyo, 1885 HANREI JIHO 3 (Sup. Ct., Jan. 26, 2005).
13. Professor TJ. Pempel notes that the Supreme Court "has been an important, if
frequently unrecognized, vehicle for preserving the status quo in Japan and for reducing
the capacity of courts to reverse executive actions." Wikipedia, Supreme Court of Japan,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme-Court-ofJapan (last visited Apr. 27, 2006). See
also infra Part IV.C.
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This note begins with a review of pertinent scholarship on legal transplants, calling attention to two important features of that process. Part II
then briefly sketches the collaborative process by which a group of American soldiers 14 and a group of Japanese officials drafted a new Constitution,
paying particular attention to the ways in which foreigners were literally
written out of the Constitution. Part III reinforces this process of exclusion
by focusing on issues of word choice. Finally, Part IV examines three judicial decisions that inform the current status and discussion of foreigners'
rights in Japan.
I.

Legal Transplants: The Synchronic and Diachronic

While the legal transplant has become the dominant metaphor for discussing transformative effects of legal borrowing, recent scholarship has
questioned the viability and value of this model. The recent profusion of
articles proposing alternatives, clarifications, and criticisms of Alan Watson's basic theory 15 is itself suggestive. Scholars have responded to Watson with such colorful theories as legal transfers, 16 legal irritants, 1 7 legal
formants, i 8 and legal translations, 19 while still others have vehemently
14. On the American side, this process was led by the Supreme Command of the
Allied Powers in the Pacific (SCAP) which was in charge of the American occupation and
administration of postwar Japan.
15. Watson shows greater interest in the fact that transplants happen, than in how
they take place, who graft them, what is selected and why, how it is later deployed, and
so on. The following passage reveals the limits characteristic of Watson's project:
It cannot be doubted either that a rule transplanted from one country to
another, from Germany to Japan, may equally operate to different effect in the
two societies, even though it is expressed in apparently similar terms in the two
countries. But our first concern will be with the existence of the rule, not with
how it operates within the society as a result of academic or judicial
interpretation.
ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 20 (1974)
(emphasis added). One problem with this approach is its confident gloss over the
"apparently similar terms" in two societies or languages. The processes of translation,
as well as transplantation, are invariably more complicated than Watson considers.
16. See, e.g., David Nelken, The Meaning of Success in TransnationalLegal Transfers,
19 WINDSOR Y.B. AcCESSJusT. 349, 353 (2001) (noting that "the question of success [of a
legal transplant] can arise in more than one stage of the transfer of legal rules and
institutions").
17. See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11, 12 (1998) (noting the transformative effects of legal borrowing on both the institution that is transplanted and the
system into which it is introduced).
18. The concept of legal formants understands law as a dynamic social process in
which groups of interpreters- -lawyers, judges, legislatures, academics--compete to
have their vision of the law prevail. See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic
Approach to Comparative Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 344-45 (1991). In the comparative context, attention focuses on the ways elites in the recipient culture selectively
deploy provisions to introduce into their legal culture. Though the donor may attempt to
control the transaction, the power of selection and absorption ultimately rests with the
host elite. P.G. Monateri, The Weak Law: Contaminationsand Legal Cultures, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 575, 583 (2003).
19. MIximo Langer proposes the alternate metaphor of "legal translation" to call
attention to the difference in meaning a legal word or concept may take on as it migrates

2006

"Omissions are not Accidents"

denied the very possibility of legal transplantation. 20
While the theoretical ingenuity used to derive alternative concepts is
impressive, their very diversity suggests that no one theory is in danger of
eclipsing the rest. Instead of coining a new metaphor and joining the
debate, however, this note first synthesizes the important lessons to be
drawn from these discussions. By culling recent legal scholarship, and
then filtering it through somewhat more venerable linguistic theory, one
can develop a new paradigm by which to understand the transplant
phenomenon.
Recent scholarship on transplants has highlighted multiple roles that
the recipient legal culture plays in adapting transplanted law. Gunther
Teubner, for example, notes the transformative effects a borrowed legal
institution may have on the receiving country's legal system. In his
account, the British absorption of the continent's "good faith" standard in
contract law actually ended up altering relations between the British judiciary and government, ceding greater power to the former. 2 1 Teubner's point
is that no transplant retains its original form or function in new surroundings. Rather, as it adapts to its new environment, it will simultaneously
push up against, and stimulate change within, the adoptive system.
The contribution of Rodolfo Sacco's "legal formants" has also heightened the debate. Briefly, Sacco aims to expand the scope of transplant
studies by engaging a broader variety of legal and institutional actors.
Instead of focusing merely on the act of legislation itself, a proper evaluation must also include the law's various constructions at the hands of
judges, attorneys, scholars, and legislators. 22 As the law is "domesticated,"
all of these institutional actors, or legal formants, compete to promote their
particular understanding of the legal transplant. Judges, for instance, interpret the transplant differently from the legislators who introduced it; the
lawyer building a case on the transplanted law will approach it differently
23
from the scholar writing about it.
from one legal system to another. M~ximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal
Procedure, 45 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 32-34 (2004).
20. Pierre Legrand's dismissal of legal transplants rests on the notions that a) meaning in a legal system cannot be reduced to the words of a regulation, and b) these words,
when inserted into a new legal system, can neither have, nor bring about, the same
meaning they had in the initial legal system. See Pierre Legrand, What "Legal Transplants"?, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 60-62 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds.,
2001). Legrand's theoretical heft somewhat obscures his power to construct or suggest
worthy paths of investigation, however. Urging scholars to apprehend "each manifestation of the law" as a "complete social fact," Legrand does not always account for the
lengthy and uneven process by which rules are actually assimilated. Id. at 60. Take, for
example, his rather conclusory description of the English borrowing of a French remedy: "[T]he French formulation was immediately domesticated by the English interpretative community with the result that the meaning of what is public law, private law ...
and so on, inevitably differs as between the two jurisdictions." Id. at 62.
21. Teubner, supra note 17, at 29.
22. Sacco, supra note 18, at 344-45.
23. See id.
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Finally, P.G. Monateri draws particular attention to the exclusivity
with which legal elites determine law. Responding to Sacco's legal formant
paradigm, Monateri examines the selection process by which the legal
elite--legislators and other official interpreters of foreign law--carefully
considers its own legal system's flaws and then selects particular remedies
to fix them. Importantly, Monateri observes that the recipient is the final
arbiter in deciding which laws to adapt, 24 a thesis which resonates intriguingly in the postwar American-Japanese context.
The three paradigms resonate with an approach to scholarship familiar to linguists and other scholars. Teubner and Sacco attend to the
diachronic adaptive processes by which a legal transplant is received and
indeed reconceived within the recipient culture. Monateri, on the other
hand, examines the synchronic "historical moment" at which the transplant
occurs, and the conscious decisions that frame the choice of particular
25
provisions.
These two frames--the diachronic and synchronic- -generally track
the scholarly agenda of legal transplant critics. Any serious discussion of
legal transplants, as would any serious study of the English language,
needs to entertain both aspects of the transplant phenomenon: the highly
charged moment of its introduction and its consequent digestion within the
new state. For the purposes of this note, the object of inquiry then shifts to
examine issues such as how an individual clause was struck from a draft,
or why a particular word was selected (among many) and inserted into the
Japanese version of the Constitution. Second, but no less vitally, one must
also attend to historical integration of the transplanted law into Japanese
legal culture. To ignore the first part would be to overlook an important
and purposive act by Japanese officials as they introduced the American
concept of "the people" into their language, law, and society. To ignore the
second would seal the Constitution off from the rough and tumble of half a
century of legal developments. But by attending to both, we can profitably
investigate a topic contested since its inception into Japan.
II.

The Constitution and the Foreigner

With the defeat of Japan in World War II, the Allied powers strived to
create a new framework for regulatingJapanese society. The 1945 Potsdam
Declaration (PD) required the Japanese government to "remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the
24. Monateri, supra note 18, at 583.

25. These terms were first defined nearly a century ago by Ferdinand de Saussure in
order to analyze language change. A diachronic ("through time") or "evolutionary"
model examines the changes within a language from two different historical moments.

For example, how did Chaucer's knight (pronounced kuh-nicht) become our knight (pronounced like night)? What happened to thee and thou? See FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE,
COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 140-3 (Charles Bally & Albert Sechehaye eds., Wade
Baskin trans., 1959). In a synchronic ("same time") study, the scholar takes a snapshot
of a language and then describes and investigates its various components. For example,
how do words relate to one another in a sentence? What is the word order? Does the
language decline or inflect? See id. at 101-2.
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Japanese People." 2 6 The task of implementing the basic PD principles fell

to Douglas MacArthur and other members
of the Supreme Command of
27
the Allied Powers in the Pacific (SCAP).

Before examining the elaborate genealogy of proto-constitutional
development, a brief chronology is in order. 28 In January 1946, the State
Department sent SCAP a blueprint of how its ideal Japanese Constitution
would appear. 2 9 With this and other provisions in mind, SCAP composed
a modelJapanese Constitution from February 3 to February 13.30 The Jap-

anese had other plans, hoping merely to bring the Meiji Constitution into
conformity with the PD principles by adding several provisions. 3 1 On Feb-

ruary 8, a Japanese committee led by Matsumoto Joji submitted their own
"Gist of the Revision of the Constitution" to SCAP, 3 2 which took over half
its provisions from the Meiji Constitution. 33 The American side was

unimpressed:
The draft of the constitutional revision, which you submitted to us the other
day, is wholly unacceptable to the Supreme Commander as a document of
freedom and democracy. The Supreme Commander, however, being fully
conscious of the desperate need of the people of Japan for a liberal and
enlightened Constitution that will defend them from the injustices of the
arbitrary control of the past, has approved this document and directed that I
present it to you as one embodying
the principles which in his opinion the
34
situation in Japan demands.
26. Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender art. 10, July 26, 1945, 3
Bevans 1204, available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html.
27. See Theodore H. McNelly, "Induced Revolution": The Policy and Process of Constitutional Reform in Occupied Japan, in DEMOCRATIZING JAPAN: THE ALLIED OCCUPATION 76,
76-77 (Robert E. Ward & Sakamoto Yoshikazu eds., 1987); see also supra note 14 (noting the role of SCAP in postwar Japan).
28. See generally National Diet Library, Chronological Table of Birth of the Constitution of Japan, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/history.html (last visited Apr.
27, 2006) (listing major events of 1945 through 1947 in chronological order).
29. This document, Decision 228 of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
(SWNCC 228), represented several months of work by the U.S. State Department. StateWar-Navy Coordinating Committee, Decision Amending SWNCC 228: Reform of the
Japanese Government System (Jan.7, 1946), available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/03/059/059tx.htnl [hereinafter SWNCC 228]. One scholar called it "the
definitive statement of U.S. policy on constitutional and governmental change in postwar Japan." It calls for a government determined by "the freely expressed will of the
Japanese people," and states that the Allies are empowered to insist that "civil is supreme
over the military branch of the government." It also instructed MacArthur to "indicate
the reforms which this Government considers necessary" in the postwar democratic
Japan, even if that should mean formal instructions. Robert E. Ward, PresurrenderPlanning: Treatment of the Emperor and Constitutional Changes, in DEMOCRATIZING JAPAN, supra
note 27, at 1, 29-30.
30. Ward, supra note 29, at 28 (noting other postwar planning documents employed
by SCAP).
31. INOUE, supra note 6, at 11.
32. An English language version of these proposed changes can be found at National
Diet Library, Matsumoto Draft Submitted to GHQ, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/
e/shiryo/03/074shoshi.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2006).
33. INOUE, supra note 6, at 12.
34. Id. at 17.
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While not an auspicious beginning, this opening shot did not completely
cut off the possibility for further refinement and collaboration with the
Japanese.
The Japanese responded with their own "translation" of the draft,
which they presented to SCAP on March 4, 1946. 35 The marathon session
of March 4 through 5, in which MacArthur demanded that Japanese and
American participants hammer out a version he could endorse, led to a
provisional "Constitution" made public on March 7.36 Next, the Japanese
Diet and Privy Council discussed, deliberated, and substantively revised
this provisional Constitution for several months. 37 On November 3, 1946,
the Japanese Constitution was promulgated. 38 To be sure, the result contained many provisions that the American side demanded; yet, as discussed below, the text of the Constitution was also significantly altered to
accommodate Japanese standards and expectations.
Throughout these months of constitutional contestation, the rights of foreigners gradually eroded. In its current form, 3 9 the Japanese Constitution
now extends its protections to "citizens of Japan," and no one else. This
significantly deviates from the original conception put forth by the
Americans.
Concern for the rights of foreigners in Japan had been an American
priority ex ante.40 The text of the MacArthur Draft of SWNCC 22841
("MacArthur Draft") states that the guarantee of basic rights would extend
"to Japanese subjects and to all persons within Japanese jurisdiction. '4 2
The decision specifically criticized the limited nature of the Meiji Constitution's protections: "Instead of granting those rights to all persons [the Meiji
Constitution] stipulates that they shall apply only to Japanese subjects,
leaving other persons in Japan without their protection. '43 These "other
persons in Japan" referred not only to the American members of SCAP, but
also to more than two million residents from the former colonies, such as
35. Id. at 22.
36. Id. at 22-26.
37. See, e.g., National Diet Library, Bill for Revision of Imperial Constitution Revised
and Passed by the House of Representatives, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/
shiryo/04/124_lshoshi.html (last visited Feb. 13, 206) (noting various amendments to
the Constitution proposed by the House of Representatives and the House of Peers).
38. INOUE, supra note 6, at 36.
39. The Japanese Constitution has not been amended since its promulgation nearly
60 years ago. Currently, however, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party is preparing a
new constitution that would expand the role of the Japanese military (to include international peacekeeping and emergency relief missions), environmental rights, and the right
to privacy. Tomohiro Kasai, Constitutional Revision Set to Be Big Issue, DAILY YOMIURI
ONLINE, Jan. 15, 2006, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20060115TDY03002.
htm.
40. See Koseki Sh6ichi, Japanizing the Constitution, 35 JAPAN Q. 234, 235 (1988); see
also SWNCC 228, supra note 29.
41. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
42. SWNCC 228, supra note 29, i 4(a)(5). As one scholar frames the constitutional
lineage "[T]here can be no doubt as to the basic paternity of the MacArthur Draft. It was
clearly SWNCC-228 where most of the basic principles were concerned." Ward, supra
note 29, at 36.
43. SWNCC 228, supra note 29, '1 6(c) (emphasis added).
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China, Taiwan, and Korea. 44
The MacArthur Draft was unambiguous in its protection of human
rights, explicitly extending it to "[all natural persons." Two key provisions
of the inchoate American version protected human rights in a very broad
manner:
Art. 13: All naturalpersons are equal before the law. No discrimination shall
be authorized or tolerated in political, economic or social relations
45 on
account of race, creed, sex or social status, caste, or national origin.
46
Art. 16: Aliens shall be entitled to the equal protection of law.
A broad penumbra of protection is evident, including provisions for
sex, social status, and race. For our purposes, we note that the protections
extend to foreigners in two discreet provisions: the "all natural persons"
and "national origin" language of Article 13, as well as "[alliens" in Article
16. The original intent of the American document was to reach all people
in Japan: citizens, foreigners, and people "in between," such as resident
Koreans and Taiwanese.
Interestingly, the first Japanese response dated March 4, 1946,
included the protection of all natural people. Though changing the language slightly, as well as the ordering of the provisions, the Japanese hewed
closely to the American draft:
Art 13: All natural people, Japanese citizens [kokumin] or otherwise, are
equal before the law. No discrimination in political, economic, or social
relations shall be tolerated due to race, creed, sex, social status, family origin, or nationality.
47
Art 14: Aliens shall be entitled to the equal protection of law.
This first step toward a jointly-authored Constitution reveals that the
Japanese side acknowledged, and indeed put into their own words, the
American desire to provide basic safeguards to citizens and non-citizens
alike. However, over the next two days, these provisions would be
eviscerated.
With the Japanese translation in hand, MacArthur ordered a new
draft-revising the Japanese version of March 4--to be drawn up and translated as quickly as possible. 4 8 Beginning at 9pm on March 4, American
and Japanese officials and linguists spent the night refining and smoothing
44. FURUKAWA ATsUSHI, KIHONTEKI JINKEN: NIHONKOKU KENPO, KENSHO 1945-2000
SHIRYO TO RONTEN, DAIYONKAN [FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS, VOL. 4 OF VERIFYING THE
JAPANESE CONSTITUTION, 1945-2000: DOCUMENTS AND ARGUMENTS] 61-62 (2001); see also
RAINICHI GAIKOKUJIN JINKEN HAKUSHO [WHITE PAPER ON RIGHTS OF FOREIGNERS IN JAPAN]
15-16 (Tanaka Hiroshi & Ebashi Takashi eds., 1997) (quoting the SCAP-drafted
"Employment Policies" that specifically required the Japanese government to ensure
equal employment rights and opportunities for Korean, Taiwanese, and Chinese
residents in Japan).
45. KOSEKI SHOICHI, THE BIRTH OF JAPAN'S POSTWAR CONSTITUTION 114 (Ray A. Moore

ed. &
46.
47.
48.

trans., 1997) (emphasis added).
Id.; see also Koseki, supra note 40, at 235.
See FURUKAWA, supra note 44, at 60-61.
INOUE,

supra note 6, at 22, 26.
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over inconsistencies in the various drafts. On March 6, the eve of public
announcement, MacArthur endorsed a working draft of the Constitution
'49
with "a sense of deep satisfaction.
During those two days, however, important alterations took place.
Article 13, for example, underwent two critical mutations. First, the drafters struck the phrase that granted equal protection to people whether "Japanese citizens [kokumin] or otherwise," defining the scope of protections to
an unqualified "all natural people." Later, further negotiation pared the
text down to merely "all people" [all kokumin]. 50 The constitutional protection of Article 13 thus shrank from protecting "[alll natural persons,
51
whether Japanese citizens or not" to "all citizens."
Second, Article 13 also excluded "nationality" [kokuseki] from the list
of prohibited bases by which to discriminate. Instead, the Japanese substituted monchi, or "family lineage," but monchi and kokuseki have very different meanings. Family lineage refers to one's status, family, or class
background, and asks whether one is a commoner, nobleman, untouchable, and so on. 52 By turning the protections inward to reach Japanese people of different classes, this provision may have entrenched human rights
within Japan. But at the same time, by using a term that described differences among Japanese people, the question of nationality was mooted.
Foreigners in Japan thus lost two forms of constitutional recourse.
More glaring still was the elimination of Article 14 in toto. Aliens,
once "entitled to the equal protection of law,"'5 3 were banished from the
text of the Constitution. Sat6 Tatsuo 5 4 asked SCAP why a separate provision protecting foreigners was necessary, and was told that "foreigners are
equal to the Japanese. '5 5 Then it need not be explicitly stated, replied Sat6
in turn, offering instead that protection for foreigners be included in Article 13.56 As discussed above, however, the subjects of Article 13 were ultimately diluted down from "all natural people, Japanese citizens or
otherwise" to "all people" [kokumin]. Thus, through a series of shifts and
eliminations, protections which the Americans once sought for themselves
and other "non-Japanese" were written out of the text; both groups were
rendered constitutional personae non gratis. Though American officials
still showed concern about nationality-based discrimination in April
49. Id. at 26.
50. FURUKAWA, supra note 44, at 61.

51. Koseki Sh6ichi, one ofJapan's leading contemporary constitutional scholars, has
found "no reliable documents that explain how the Japanese presented the proposal to
eliminate the reference to foreigners' rights, nor why the Americans agreed to accept it."
KOSEKI, supra note 45, at 129.
52. KENKYusHA's NEW JAPANEsE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 1125-26.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 46, 47.
54. Sat6 was a councilor on the Bureau of Legislation, frequent go-between in the
discussions, and advocate for narrow protections of human rights. Recent critics have
accused Sat6 of inserting "interpretations into legal texts by manipulating phraseology
and nuance." Koseki, supra note 40, at 235.
55. KoSEKI, supra note 45, at 119-20.

56. Id. at 120.
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1946, 57 the provision would not be altered.
Sat6s desire to eliminate protections for foreigners becomes clearer
upon reading his testimony before the Japanese Diet many years later. In
his words, "treating foreigners equally was bad enough in itself, but having
to include Article 16 [protecting aliens] in the Japanese draft was particularly objectionable." 58 To be sure, not allJapanese members of the drafting
committee or translation staff shared this sentiment.5 9 Nevertheless,
through selective inclusion and omission of provisions the American side
sought to include, the Japanese Constitution did not simply instantiate the
will of the Americans. This note now turns to the ways that word choice
played a role in limiting foreigners' rights.
III.

Choice Words

For most of the translation and revision process, Japanese drafters
tended to use the word kokumin to translate the English term "the people,"
"all the people," and "all natural persons." The word kokumin, a compound meaning literally "people [mini of a state [koku]," has at least two
meanings in English. First, it refers literally to the people within a country,
or "residents," without a strong political connotation. But it has a more
modern, political significance as well, roughly equivalent to the English
word "citizen" or "national," as when we might call someone "a Chinese
national."'60 By couching the inclusive English terms "people/persons"
and "citizen" into the bivalent kokumin, Japanese officials and translators
could limit the protective power of the Constitution.
The choice of kokumin as the appropriate translation, however, was far
from inevitable. The reason for its choice, at least according to the transcripts, lay in its capacity to incorporate the emperor and the people as one
unit or body in a non-oppositional manner. 6 1 Other contenders for this
crucial feature of the constitutional lexicon included shinmin (subjects),
jinmin (people), and kokujin (people of a state). 6 2 The selection process
itself deserves our attention, as it too has an important political dimension.
When the Japanese government submitted its first preliminary draft to
SCAP, it used the word shinmin (subjects) to refer to the people of Japan.
57. THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF ITS FRAMING AND ADOP1945-1947, at RM278 9 3 (Princeton University Press CD-ROM, 1998) [hereinaf-

TION,

ter THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN].

58. Koseki, supra note 40, at 235-36.
59. See KOSEKI, supra note 45, at 180-81.
60. Lydia Liu refers to this type of compound as a "return graphic loan." Nineteenth-century Japanese scholars selected certain compounds from classical Chinese to
serve as translations for important European concepts then being introduced into Japan.
The term kokumin, or guomin in Chinese, has a history spanning thousands of years,
back to China's first narrative history, the fifth century B.C. Zuo Zhuan [Zuo's Chronicles]. LYDIA H. LIU, TRANSLINGUAL PRACTICE: LITERATURE, NATIONAL CULTURE, AND TRANSLATED MODERNITY--CHINA, 1900-1937, at 302, 308 (1995).
61. INOUE, supra note 6, at 190-205.
62. See discussion infra notes 63-71; THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, supra note 57, at

RM325.PM.SP17

2.
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This term, combining shin (public minister; servant) and min (people;
masses), preserved a linguistic and conceptual vestige of the Meiji Constitution which subordinated the subjects to the emperor. 63 The word did not
pass muster for this very reason. Even if SCAP envisioned postwar Japan
as a democratic monarchy, sovereignty must reside with the people, and
not with the emperor. According to SCAP, calling the people "subjects"
would not sufficiently bolster their status or give Japan a sufficiently demo64
cratic basis.
The closest challenger to kokumin was jinmin, a much broader, and in
some ways less palpably political, term. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, preparing an early English-language draft for the cabinet, employed
jinmin to translate the English word "people. ''65 The word, consisting ofjin
(person; persons) and min (people; masses) had also found its way into
Japanese translations of international treaties, such as the Kellogg-Briand
Pact. 6 6 In draft constitutions proposed by the Japanese Communist Party,
67
moreover, jinmin was the preferred term.

To some Japanese, however, including members of various drafting
committees, the term had excessively Marxist overtones. The word intimated "people who have liberated themselves from oppressors, '68 or "the
ruled or folk standing in contrast to the Government or the ruler."6 9 This
might have seemed an attractive alternative, particularly to those who
wanted the new Constitution to break with the militaristic wartime Japanese government. Despite the term's Marxist leanings, many occupation
officials still sought to use jinmin, which "covers all inhabitants of Japan,
including foreign nationals, but excludes the emperor." 70 Here again, the
American inclination toward inclusive language collided with the Japanese
71
desire to restrict the scope of these provisions.
INOUE, supra note 6, at 188-89.
64. Kanamori Tokujir6, an important presence in the drafting and larger constitutional debate, explained the difference to the Diet in the following way: "This word
[shinmin] has not been especially chosen for this draft Constitution with the view of
criticizing the word used in the [Meiji] Constitution." THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, supra
note 57, at RM456.
65. INOUE, supra note 6, at 189.
63.

1 (com66. See THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, supra note 57, at RM325.PM.SP16
ments of Kita Reikichi); Treaty Between the United States and Other Powers Providing
for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat.
2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
67. INOUE, supra note 6, at 189; TAKEMAE Eiji & OKABE FUMINOBU, KENPO SEITEISHI:
NIHONKOKU KENPO, KENSHO, 1945-2000 SHIRYO TO RONTEN, DAi'IKKAN [HISTORY OF THE
ENACTMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION, VOL. 1 OF VERIFYING THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION, 19452000: DOCUMENTS AND ARGUMENTS]

117 (2000).

68. INOUE, supra note 6, at 189.
69. THE CONSTITUTION OFJAPAN, supra note 57, at RM325.PM.SP16

1 (comments of

Kita Reikichi).
70. Koseki, supra note 40, at 236.
71. Sylvia Brown Hamano, Incomplete Revolutions and Not So Alien Transplants: The
Japanese Constitution and Human Rights, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 415, 438 (1999) (noting
"from the very outset the Japanese government strove to limit legal protections for the
basic human rights of non-Japanese").
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In the end, however, kokumin prevailed. Though evidence suggests
that high-ranking American officials understood the difference between
jinmin and kokumin, 72 they ultimately accepted that rights be granted only
to kokumin. Conventional scholarship claims kokumin prevailed over the
others because it included both the emperor and the people; 73 in the postwar Japanese state, the emperor was no longer above the people of Japan,
but was to be inalienably one of them. Using jinmin, however, would only
call attention to the difference in status, in effect splintering the populace
from the emperor. Kokumin would transcend this fissure, uniting the Japa74
nese people with their fallen patriarch.
What SCAP might not have expected, however, was a key insertion
made by the Japanese Diet some months later. Now that kokumin had
gained ascendancy in the text of the Constitution, the next step was to
define the term. At the beginning of Chapter Three of the Constitution,
"Rights and Duties of the People," the Diet introduced a clarification of
kokumin in Article 10: "The conditions necessary for becoming a Japanese
national [kokumin] shall be determined by law." 75 Though SCAP welcomed the addition, it is unlikely they could predict what would happen
76
several years later.
In 1950, the Diet passed the Nationality Law, which narrowly construed kokumin to persons holding Japanese citizenship. 77 The Diet thus
froze the politically-edged meaning of kokumin into law: the "citizens," not
the "people," would henceforth receive constitutional protection. Foreigners--at this moment resident Koreans and Taiwanese 78 and later also
American teachers and Brazilian journalists 79 - -were now effectively
effaced from the Constitution.
Despite the clearly unequal positions from which postwar America
and Japan debated the latter's constitutional principles, the notion of pure
imposition is no longer viable. To be sure, SCAP insisted on including
72. INOUE, supra note 6, at 190.

73. Id.
74. THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, supra note 57, at RM325.PM.SP17 9 2 (noting the
following statement by Kanamori: "I thought ... we had better make use of one word, in

spite of some difficulty or inconvenience, that might express the idea of oneness of the
ruler and the people, and after a careful study and examination, we arrived at the conclusion that we should use the word 'Kokumin' (people) in denoting our ruler and ourselves together").
75. KoSEKI, supra note 45, at 179-80.

76. Id. at 180.
77. Id.
78. Though this note does not focus on the difficulties faced by resident Koreans and

Taiwanese with regard to their national status, the issue needs to be raised. Many were
brought to Japan as slave-laborers during the colonial period (Japan began to colonize
Taiwan in 1895 and Korea in 1910), only to find themselves as an unprotected class after
the war. Many of these two million "residents" left Japan in the postwar period, but
some 600,000 Koreans remained in Japan. Paul E. Kim, Note, Darkness in the Land of the
Rising Sun: How the Japanese Discriminate Against Ethnic Koreans Living in Japan, 4 C~ARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 479, 483 (1996).
79. See infra Part IV.A-B.
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many principles that later became constitutional provisions. 80 But other
American suggestions were not so readily absorbed. The Japanese domestication of key American ideas--among them the protection of foreigners--involved a series of eliminations, redefinitions, and amendments.
The successful lobbying by conservative Japanese such as Sat6 Tatsuo 8 1
that limited constitutional safeguards should give us pause, for the act of
translation itself--of word choice, editing, substituting, interpreting- -necessitated important political choices. The drafters of the Japanese
Constitution, in choosing the word kokumin to translate the English word
"people," clearly set the stage for a contraction of protection. This choice
word, coupled with the Diet's later insertion of Article 10--requiring "Japanese national" to be defined by law- -effectively eliminated rights guarantees to non-Japanese. 8 2 What this deferral did not do, however, was to
resolve basic questions about the status of foreigners in Japan. The result
has been to give that decision-making authority over to the judiciary, which
now presides over cases where foreigners sue the executive branch.
IV.

Ongoing Debate: the Courts

Having outlined the basic process by which the Constitution came to
exclude foreigners, we now turn to how that exclusion has played out until
the present. As might be expected, the removal of foreigners from constitutional purview simply left issues unsettled, many to the present day. Further clarification has been provided by subsequent court decisions at all
levels: Supreme Court, high courts, and district courts. 8 3 Before examining the contribution courts have made in redefining foreigners' rights in
Japan, we briefly note this important change of "venue:" an entirely new set
of legal formants- -judges, attorneys, disgruntled foreigners--has been
invited to shape the debate over foreigners' rights in Japan. The arena--the
courtroom, as opposed to SCAP headquarters or the Diet--has also
changed, and with it standards of "acceptable" treatment of human beings.
Banished from the Constitution, foreigners now flock to the courts.
A.

McLean v. Minister of Justice

The most relevant judicial decision concerning the rights of foreigners
dates from 1978.84 The Minister of Justice denied an American English
teacher's application to renew his visa after he participated in antiwar demonstrations and failed to notify the Immigration Office of his change in
workplace.8 5 McLean successfully sued the Minister of Justice in Tokyo
80. Hamano, supra note 71, at 426-27.
81. KOSEKI, supra note 45, at 118-22.
82. Koseki, supra note 40, at 236.
83. See generally Hamano, supra note 71, at 442-67.
84. All facts from this paragraph are taken from the editorial note preceding the
translation of the case. See McLean v. Minister of Justice, 32 MINSHO 7, 1223 (Sup. Ct.,
Oct. 4, 1978), translated in LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990, at 471 (1996).
85. id.
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District Court which chastised the Ministry's denial as unfair, inappropriate from a social standpoint, and "contrary to the constitutional aspiration
86
for international cooperation and fundamental human rights."
Appealed to the Tokyo High Court and then to the Supreme Court of
87
Japan, however, the case has come to stand for a number of propositions.
With regard to the Minister's denial of McLean's application, the Supreme
Court held that the Minister could exercise discretion in deciding what
constituted a threat to international (here, Japan-U.S.) relations. Since customary international law places the decision of admitting aliens into the
hands of each nation, the Minster's act was neither "clearly unreasonable"
nor "improper by society's views."8 8 Consequently, it did not violate
law.89

At the same time, the decision also precariously positioned the rights
of foreigners in Japan. According to the Court, "the guarantees of fundamental human rights contained in Chapter 3 of the Constitution, with the
exception of those rights which by their nature must be limited to the Japanese [kokumin], apply equally to aliens staying within our country." 90 At
once guaranteeing and withholding rights from foreigners, this statement
was later clarified in the opinion. The Court explained that even though
McLean's participation in political demonstrations was constitutional and
lawful, the Minister of Justice still had discretion to decide that it was
"undesirable for Japan" to admit him into the country. 9 1 Foreigners are
guaranteed the right to march in Japanese demonstrations, it would seem,
but not the right to march into Japan.
Needless to say, this holding has generated many interpretations. In
addition to the right to enter Japan, Japanese scholars have also understood
the rights "limited to Japanese citizens" to include suffrage and possibly
the right to survive. 92 While the human rights of foreigners and Japanese
are thus "close," they are not coterminous. Confusing matters further,
some scholars have interpreted that certain aspects of suffrage--such as
the right to participate in local (not national) elections and the right to
hold certain non-elected government appointments- -may be extended to
93
foreigners.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 474-78 ("The Decision of This Court").

88. Id. at 478.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 477 (emphasis added).
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Munesue Toshiyuki, Jinken Hosh6 wo D6 Teijfi Gaikokujin nimo Hirogete
Yuku ka [How to Extend the Protection of Human Rights to Permanent Residents?], in 59
ASAHI SHIMBUN EXTRA REPORT & ANALYSIS: KENPO GA WAKARU [UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION] 102, 105 (2000) (noting that the right to vote is limited to the Japanese);
Kuramochi Takashi, Jiygt Kahutoku no Doryoku: Gaikokujin no Jinken wo Mite Ayuku
[Efforts to Gain Freedom: Looking at the Human Rights of Foreigners] 534 HOGAXU
SEMINA 82, 85 (1999) (holding up the rights to vote, to enter Japan, and to survive as
traditionally limited to the Japanese).
93. Kuramochi, supra note 92, at 85.
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McLean's puzzling and open-ended holding does not carve out the
rights of foreigners in stone. Though setting aside some core rights which
"by their nature" the Constitution does not extend to foreigners, 94 the case
does not specifically tell us what those rights are. While scholars have
tried to map out the limits, the opinion does not adequately guide courts.
Of course, Japan being a civil law country, its lower courts would not be
bound by Supreme Court holdings. 95 However, McLean fails to define
either the limits or an adequate source to which courts may turn as they
grapple with the question of foreigners' rights. This has given great latitude
to the decision-making capacity of lower courts.
B. Bortz v. Suzuki
Walking into a jewelry store may seem perfectly pedestrian, but it
actually brought about a lawsuit, a small media blitz, 96 and eventually a
$12,500 award, 97 a sizable sum for aJapanese human rights case. In 1998,
Ana Bortz, a Brazilian journalist walked into a jeweler in Hamamatsu,
Japan (population 570,000), which had implemented a "No foreigners" policy of simply not allowing foreigners on the store premise. Upon ascertaining Bortz was Brazilian (and not, as they had first judged, a representative
of a French jewelry manufacturer 9 8), the owners of the store pointed at a
sign saying "Foreigners are not allowed in this store." They then asked
Bortz to leave, in English and Japanese, eventually calling the police to eject
her. After three hours of remonstrations, unsuccessful demands for apologies, and threatened lawsuits, Bortz left the store with her Japanese-Brazilian husband. 99
Bortz's vindication in Shizuoka District Court attracted the attention
of many. Judge Soh Tetsuro's far-reaching opinion not only wove in the
philosophical and historical strands of the human rights doctrine, dating
from Confucius to the present, 100 but also creatively welded constitutional
and international treaty law. 1 1 As in McLean, the opinion turned to a
constitutional principle, here a "strong commitment to international cooperation." 10 2 The court then looked toward international norms and cited
an international treaty Japan had recently ratified, namely, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
94. See supra text accompanying note 90.
95. Lower courts are not bound to follow the decisions of the Japanese Supreme
Court, though they tend to do so. Percy R. Luney, Jr., The Judiciary:Its Organizationand
Status in the ParliamentarySystem, 53 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 159 (1990).
96. Even the New York Times published an article on the suit. See Howard W.
French, Japan Only Policy Takes Body Blow in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1999, at Al.
97. Bortz v. Suzuki, 1045 HANREI TAIMUZU 216 (Shizuoka D. Ct., Oct. 12, 1999).
98. Sumi Shin, Newcomer Migrants: Implications for Japan's Administration of Social
Services and Nationality, 6 UCLAJ. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 313, 361 n.213 (2002).
99. Bortz, 1045 HANREI TAIMUZU at 217-18.
100. Id. at 225-28.
101. Id. at 223-25.
102. Id. at 224. Article 98 of the Constitution ensures that the "treaties concluded by
Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully observed." KENPO, art. 98, para.
2.
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(CERD). 0 3
Whether international treaties are binding in Japan is a complex topic,
but here it suffices to note that Japanese courts have invoked them in occa-

sional human rights cases. 10 4 In other words, judges may give international treaties a kind of indirect effect by applying an internationallyderived standard to domestic law, as the judge did in the Bortz case. Article 6 of CERD guarantees victims of racial discrimination the right to seek
damages in the tribunals of the host country. 10 5 As Bortz was undoubtedly a victim of racially discriminatory acts in Japan, the district court

devised a remedy through Japanese tort law. 10 6 With no constitutional
provision, Supreme Court case, or domestic anti-discrimination legislation 10 7 directly on point, the judge was at liberty to look beyond Japanese
law and reach out for an international human rights standard. Compensation for Bortz's suffering was based on provisions of international treaty

law and cost the discriminating jeweler 1.5 million yen, or roughly
$12,500.108
C.

Chong v. Tokyo

After working for six years as Tokyo's first non-Japanese public health
nurse, Chong Hyang-gyun, a Korean resident in Japan, set her sights on
becoming a manager. 10 9 Having fulfilled all necessary requirements for
the promotion, she applied to take the managerial level examination in
March 1994, but the Tokyo metropolitan government refused her application because she was not Japanese."I 0 Chong sued the city in 1994, seek103. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, S. EXEC. Doc. C, 95-2, 660 U.N.T.S. 195
(entered into force for Japan on Jan. 16, 1996) [hereinafter CERD].
104. YujI IWASAWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND JAPANESE LAW: THE IMPACT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON JAPANESE LAw 37 (1998).
105. Article 6 of CERD provides,
States Parties shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies through the competent national tribunals and other State
institutions against any acts of racial discrimination which violate his human
rights and fundamental freedoms contrary to this Convention, as well as the
right to seek from such tribunals just and adequate reparation or satisfaction for
any damage suffered as a result of such discrimination.
CERD, supra note 103, art. 6.
106. Article 709 of the Civil Code codifies what we would call a tort, providing that
"[a] person who intentionally or negligently has infringed upon the rights of another is
liable for the resultant damages." MINPO, art. 709.
107. Keiko Yamanaka, Ana Bortz's Law Suit and Minority Rights in Japan (Japan Policy
Res. Inst., Working Paper No. 88, 2002), available at http://www.jpri.org/publications/
workingpapers/wp88.html.
108. Id.
109. Promotion Just for Japanese: Supreme Court, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, Jan. 27, 2005,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20050127al .htm.
110. Born in Japan in 1950 to a Korean father and Japanese mother, Chong was a
Japanese national at birth. However, with the 1952 signing of Peace Treaties with Korea
and China, Japan effectively "alienated" hundreds of thousands of Koreans and Chinese
who elected to remain in Japan after the war, ending Chong's Japanese citizenship.
David McNeill, "I want to make Japan a better place to live", JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, Feb. 1,
2005, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/member/member.html?fl2005020 lzg.htm; Tanaka
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ing the right to sit for the examination and two million yen in damages. 11
The Tokyo District Court dismissed both claims, holding somewhat narrowly that the "Constitution does not guarantee foreigners the right to
l2
employment as a civil servant [at the managerial level].""
On appeal, the Tokyo High Court reversed, holding that employing
foreigners in certain types of civil service positions 1 3 would not infringe
the principle of "national sovereignty" envisioned in Article 1 of the Constitution. 114 Rather than uniformly reject all foreign applicants, the city
would first have to determine whether the position required one to make
decisions concerning the exercise of government authority. 1 15 If it did,
that position would only be available to Japanese citizens [kokumin] under
the principle of "national sovereignty." 1 6 If it did not, foreigners could
apply for the position, relying on the protections of Articles 22(1) 1 17 and
14(1)118 of the Constitution. 1 9 The appellate court awarded Chong
Hiroshi, Saiksai hanketsu wa d6 ichizukerareruka [How Will the Supreme Court's Decision Be Evaluated?], 77 HoiTsu JIHO 86, 88 (2005). Though Chong could have applied
for, and perhaps received, Japanese nationality, she retained her South Korean citizenship because of the "history between the two countries; I'd like Japan to acknowledge
this history and apologize for it." McNeill, supra note 110.
111. Chong's argument had three prongs: 1) refusing a foreign applicant the right to
work as a local civil servant violated Articles 14 (equality under the law) and 22.1 (right
to choose one's profession) of the Constitution; 2) since permanent residents like Chong
were no different from Japanese citizens, they should not be excluded from managerial
employment; 3) unlike the right to vote in local elections which according to a 1995
Supreme Court decision required local legislation, foreigners were not restricted by law
from working as local civil servants. Chong v. Tokyo (Chong 1), 1566 HANPFi JIHO 23, 23
(Tokyo D. Ct., May 16, 1996).
112. Id. at 31 (translated by author).
113. The High Court devised a tripartite typology of civil servant positions based on
the responsibilities each position entailed. The first type included positions directly
related to the functioning of government; a foreigner working in such a position would
offend the principle of "national sovereignty" and would thus violate the Constitution.
The second type included positions indirectly related to the functioning of the government; for such a position, an independent assessment of the contents, authorities, and
functions must take place before it was offered to a foreigner. The third type included
positions with virtually no relation to the functioning of government and which could be
freely taken by foreigners. Chong v. Tokyo (Chong II), 1639 HANREI JIHO 30, 33-34
(Tokyo High Ct., Nov. 26, 1997).
114. National sovereignty [kokumin shuken] returns us to the problem of translation

and word choice. The term could be rendered more literally as "citizen sovereignty," the
implication being that only citizens of Japan should decide the country's fate. Article 1
of the Constitution provides that the emperor shall be the symbol of the state and that
his position derives "from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power."
KENPO, art. 1.
115. Chong II, 1639 HANIui JIHO at 34.
116. Id.
117. Article 22(1) of the Japanese Constitution ensures that "[e]very person shall
have freedom to choose ... his occupation to the extent that it does not interfere with
the public welfare." KENPO, art. 22, para. 1. Here, it is important to note that the subject
of this sentence is not "people" in the sense of Japanese citizens [kokumin], but rather
"everybody" or "anybody" [nanibito]. Many constitutional provisions are written in this
kind of inclusive, and less politically charged, language.
118. Article 14(1) guarantees that "[a]ll of the people [kokumun] are equal under the
law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations
because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin." KENPO, art. 14, para. 1.
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400,000 yen, or roughly $3,300.120
Seven years later, in a Grand Bench decision, 12 1 the Supreme Court
reversed the High Court's decision. 12 2 Thirteen Justices agreed that the
city had a "rational basis" for distinguishing between foreigners and Japanese nationals in the appointment of local civil servants. 1 23 Given the
principle of "national sovereignty . . . it should be assumed that those
appointed to local civil servant positions requiring exercise of public
authority hold Japanese nationality."1 2 4 Because a rational basis could be
discerned, Tokyo's policy did not violate Article 14(1) of the
Constitution.

1 25

The Court's logic failed to persuade two Justices on the Court 126 and
many in the press 12 7 and academia. 1 28 Dissenting Justice Takii Shigeo
conceded that certain managerial posts could only be filled by citizens;
however, he argued that Tokyo could not uniformly exclude foreigners
from all managerial posts, regardless of the type of the positions, because
there was no "rational basis" for a local governing body to be comprised
solely of Japanese nationals. 12 9 Similarly, Justice Izumi Tokuji first pointed
out that the state did not place any legal restrictions on special permanent
residents, such as Chong, relating to their appointment as local civil serAgain, it should be emphasized that "the people" here means "Japanese citizens," not
members of the human race.
119. Chong 11, 1639 HANRi JiHO at 34.
120. Id. at 35.
121. The Japanese Supreme Court normally handles cases in petit benches of five
Justices. For constitutional issues, all fifteen Justices sit. Luney, supra note 95, at 147.
122. Chong v. Tokyo (Chong III), 1885 HANREI JIHO 3, 7 (Sup. Ct., Jan. 26, 2005).
123. Id. at 9.
124. Id. (translated by author).
125. Id.
126. Justices Takii Shigeo and Izumi Tokuji both issued dissents. Id. at 12-18.
127. The Asahi Shimbun called the decision "anachronistic" and "backward-looking."
See Yamauchi Toshihiro, Gaikokujin no kumu shaiinken to kokumin shuken gainen no
ran'y5 [Foreigners' rights to public employment and the abuse of the concept of popular
sovereignty], 77 HORITSU JIHO 72, 72 (2005) (quoting the Asahi Shimbun editorial of January 27, 2005). The Japan Times suggested that the country needed to "make better use
of talented people, Japanese or non-Japanese." Better Use of Talented People,JAPAN TIMES
WEEKLY ONLINE, Feb. 5, 2005, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/weekly/ed/ed20050205al.
htm.
128. See, e.g., Kond6 Atsushi, Shogaikoku ni okeru komuin no shfininken [Civil servants'
right to appointment in foreign countries], 77 HORITSU JIHo 68, 68 (2005) ("In the
Supreme Court's decision, the concept of rule [tchi] is overbroad ....
The principle of
national sovereignty means only that decisions concerning the proper governance of the
country shall be based on the collective will of the citizenry. The principle does not
mean that every civil servant charged with the exercise of public authority will be a
citizen.") (translated by author); Okada Masanori, Saishin hanrei enshfashitsu (gyoseiho):
'K6kenryoku no k6shi' wa shuhen (t6chihen) no klshi to d6gi ha [Recent case study (administrative law): Is 'the exercise of state power' synonymous with the exercise of sovereignty
(right to rule)?], 607 HOGAuU SEMINA 119, 119 (2005) ("The decision ... confuses the
concepts of state power, sovereignty, and the right to rule.") (translated by author);
Yamauchi, supra note 127, at 74 (noting that the court's reasoning had "several 'logical
leaps"').
129. Chong III, 1885 HANREI JIHO at 13 (Takii, J., dissenting).
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vants. 130 He then indicated that special permanent residents had strong
ties to the local community and that, if local governments were to limit
13 1
their rights, there must be a better ("stricter") reason for doing so.
Though both dissents reveal critical gaps in the majority's opinion and
city's nationality requirement, their observations were not enough to sway
a sufficient number of the other Justices to their side.
Critics likewise pointed out logical deficiencies in the holding.
Yamauchi Toshihiro noted the key difference between governance at the
national level and governance at the local level.1 3 2 Since residents (including foreigners) were part of the local body politic, it was perfectly appropriate that they participate in local governance. 13 3 Moreover, there were
plenty of civil positions (e.g. tax collectors, policemen, etc.) which exercised a type of public authority but lacked final responsibility for matters
relating to governance; 13 4 the servant would still have to follow her superior's orders.
Japanese courts have reintroduced the problem of defining and protecting the rights of foreigners for a new generation. In McLean, Bortz, and
Chong, courts have attempted to fill in constitutional omissions concerning
the rights of foreigners by reference to other constitutional provisions and
international human rights law. The excision has, on the one hand,
opened up a wider storehouse of protections for judges to invoke, including fairly expansive international human rights treaties. 135 On the other
hand, the exclusion has also sent judicial interpreters back to the Constitution to ascertain which rights might be deemed appropriate for
36
foreigners. 1
In a legal system that does not require stare decisis,13 7 courts are given
a fair amount of discretion in handling cases without being bound by earlier decisions. As the Bortz opinion suggests, this has lent judges considerable leeway in devising a remedy. 138 Ironically, exclusion from the
Constitution has made foreigners' rights reviewable on a case-by-case basis.
As McLean and Chong clearly indicate, however, a governmental body that
discriminates against foreigners need only appeal to the highest court to
vindicate the right to discriminate. The Japanese Supreme Court has
earned a reputation for both deference to the other branches of govern13 9
ment and conservatism with respect to human rights and social issues.
This tendency has not eluded international organizations, such as Amnesty
International and the United Nations, which have repeatedly criticized "the
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 16 (Izumi, J., dissenting).
Id. at 17.
Yamauchi, supra note 127, at 74.

Id.
134. Id. at 75.
135. See supra Part IV.B.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 109-134.
137. Luney, supra note 95, at 159.
138. Id. (noting that "lower court judges tend to be more liberal and more protective
of fundamental human rights than Supreme Court justices").

139. Id. at 154, 161.
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rational discrimination" that Japanese courts and the government employ
14 0
in their treatment of foreigners.

Conclusion
By addressing diachronic and synchronic developments in Japanese
constitutional law, this note casts the complicated status of foreigners into
bolder relief. First, we examined key moments in the drafting of the Constitution that showed how the Japanese drafting committee, with the agreement of their American counterparts, circumscribed the protective aegis of
the Constitution. 14 1 This was effectuated through a complex process of
deleting certain provisions, revising and paring down others, and finally
employing the fraught term kokumin. 14 2 While aliens were displaced from
the constitutional text, however, the problem of the foreigners' rights did
not simply subside, but rather opened up new avenues of redress. Repeatedly, foreigners have turned to Japanese courts to shore up their rights,
143
requiring us to take a diachronic approach to the issue.
While Japanese courts have not elucidated a platform of rights that
foreigners may enjoy in complete security, they have shown an occasionally
more liberal approach to the issue than the early drafters did. In McLean,
the Supreme Court made a positive grant of protections to foreigners, but
did not adequately define the limits of those protections. Decades later, an
enterprising district court judge used this instability to justify a turn from
domestic positive law toward international legal standards. Whether Japanese courts will again employ such a liberal reading of the law to resolve
the rights of foreigners remains to be seen, but in the meantime, unfettered
by a constitutional provision, they have a wide panoply of sources to consult in devising a remedy.

140. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Committee, Considerationof Reports Submitted by
States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding observations of the Human
Rights Committee: Japan, T1 11, 13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.102 (Nov. 19, 1998)
(expressing the Committee's concern about such issues as the "vagueness of the concept
of 'reasonable discrimination,"' and the "discrimination against members of the Japanese-Korean minority who are not Japanese citizens"). Likewise, Amnesty International
has criticized the xenophobia of the Japanese government: "Just because foreign
residents do not have Japanese citizenship, it does not mean that foreign residents do
not have rights. . . .Japan has a duty ...under the U.N. agreements that it has signed."
McNeill, supra note 110 (quoting an Amnesty International official).
141. See supra Part II.
142. See supra Part III.
143. See supra Part IV.

